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Abstract – One core aspect of argumentation is the inferential reasoning that justifies the 
transition from the premises to the conclusion. Classical rhetoric accounted for such 
inference in terms of topoi (or topics), while contemporary approaches have introduced the 
notion of argumentation schemes, even if the two concepts still largely coexist. Different 
approaches exist to the analysis and classification of topoi/schemes. This paper ponders on 
how two different approaches, the Argomentum Model of Topics (AMT) and the pragma-
dialectical account of schemes, can serve the purposes of discourse analysts interested in 
argumentation. While discourse analysis tends to approach topoi from a content-based 
perspective, in this paper the view is taken that relying on more formalised accounts may 
add methodological rigour to the analysis of real-life argumentation, while enhancing 
points of contact between discourse analysis and argumentation theory. In particular, the 
AMT and the pragma-dialectical schemes are applied to the analysis of arguments used in 
editorials on Brexit, with a focus on populism. Building on a previous study in which 
recurrent topoi were analysed drawing on a content-based approach, this paper will try to 
establish connections between the topoi thus identified and more formalised classifications 
of argument schemes, considering the pros and cons of the two approaches.  
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Topoi have always been at the centre of argumentation studies and several 
contemporary approaches exist to their classification, all in their way struggling 
with the tension between comprehensiveness and manageability. Some 
distinguish several types (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Walton et al. 
2008), producing long, fine-grained lists, while others, prevalently informed by 
logic, identify a limited number of abstract schemes (and sub-schemes) to which 
real instances of argumentation can be referred to (van Eemeren et al. 1996). 
Still others, as is the case with the Discourse-Historical Approach (Reisigl, 
Wodak 2001) are content-based and are not worried with classifications at all, 
deducing from the data “recurring content-related conclusion rules that are 
typical for specific fields of social action” (Reisigl 2014, p. 77).  




This chapter considers how some of these approaches can serve the purposes 
of discourse analysts interested in argumentation, applying them to the 
analysis of arguments used pro and against Brexit in editorials published in 
UK quality newspapers. In the referendum campaign, the debate over Brexit 
was closely knit with the theme of populism, thus reflecting on the small 
scale discourses about populism circulating in academic circles and the 
society at large. The editorials taken into account in this paper offer an ideal 
object of analysis as they contributed to the creation of arguments pro and 
against Brexit, orienting public opinion both directly and interdiscursively. 
The patterns of reasoning featured in the editorials may, indeed, reach a 
larger audience than that of newspaper readers, trickling down through the 
mediation of TV talk-shows, radio programs, and social media. Through 
repetition these arguments may become ‘commonplaces’, which are 
interesting, from a discursive perspective, because they are the repository of a 
“shared social practice of argumentation” (Balkin 1996).1 Adding to the 
discursive dimension an argumentative perspective may result in a more 
systematic analysis, where the formal, procedural aspect of topoi can 
contribute to highlight common discursive threads out of the many single 
arguments discussed in each editorial. In this way different discursive 
realisations may be reconstructed as variations on the same topoi, which, 
once identified, will form an initial mapping of prototypical patterns of 
reasoning deployed in discussions about populism, but also in the 
Europeanism vs sovereignism debate.  
In the light of these considerations, and drawing on a previous study 
(Degano, Sicurella 2019), which considered, among other things, topoi in the 
Brexit debate from a purely content-based perspective, this paper will try to 
recast them in terms of topoi attested in the literature, testing how two 
approaches in particular, the pragma-dialectical (van Eemeren 2010; van 
Eemeren, Grotendorst 2004) and the Argomentum Model of Topoi (Rigotti 
2009; Rigotti, Greco-Morasso 2010), can serve the purposes of discourse 
analysts. 
The intent of identifying forms of argumentation typical of a given 
field, or of an activity type, is in line with the recent developments of 
pragma-dialectics, which is now oriented to exploring how different contexts 
create different conditions for argumentation (see van Eemeren 2010). 
Ultimately, identifying topoi is also a prerequisite for evaluating the quality 
of arguments, an aspect that goes beyond the scope of this paper, but would 
be worth pursuing in future developments. An increased familiarity with 
formal topoi may help identify flaws in reasoning, and after all, the 
 
1  For the use of topoi in critical discourse analysis, see also Žagar (2010).   
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overarching assumption behind the pragma-dialectical endeavour is that a 
better understanding of argumentation practices would improve the quality of 
discussion in contemporary democratic societies. 
 
 
2. Topoi and schemes 
 
In spite of its centrality to argumentation theory, the concept of topos still 
lacks a unified definition (see, among others, Drehe 2011; Kienpointner 
1997; Rigotti, Morasso 2010).2 This is partly due to an original 
terminological ambiguity in Aristotle’s work, where the term refers both to 
places where arguments can be found and to ‘warrants’ backing the inference 
that leads from the premise to a conclusion (Walton et al. 2008, p. 275). In 
Aristotle’s book that most deals with topoi, the concept is not formally 
defined, even though in one passage (Topics VIII.1, 155b4-5) topoi are 
assimilated to places from which an opponent’s thesis can be attacked, that is, 
a starting point (Rapp 2009). In the Topics, topoi are organised according to 
their formal criteria, resting on relations such as genus-species, opposition, 
identity, verbal classification. In the Rhetoric, topoi are more ‘material’ in 
nature, and the choice of the appropriate topos depends not on formal criteria, 
but on “the content of the conclusion – whether, for example, something is 
said to be useful or honorable or just” (Rapp 2009).3 The realm of rhetoric is 
the non-compulsive, the credible, the plausible (Perelman, Olbrects-Tyteca 
1969, pp. 1-4), reason why the arguments used in discussions falling in this 
dimension often rest on general premises that, differently from the universal 
generalisations of syllogisms, are true only to an extent. Such premises are 
referred to as defeasible, or enthymematic generalisations which are “true 
only for the most part”, until an exception disproves them (Walton et al. 
2008, pp. 230-231).4 
In contemporary approaches, topoi are intended as warrants backing 
the logical inference that leads from premises to a conclusion (Walton et al. 
2008, p. 275), and they co-exist with the broader notion of schemes. The 
concept of ‘argumentation scheme’, introduced informally by Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) has been further developed and now refers to “an 
abstract characterisation of the way in which in a particular type of 
 
2  Synonyms of topos are ‘topic’, used in the pragma-dialectical terminology (see for example the 
notion of ‘topical potential’ introduced in the extended version of pragma-dialectics, van 
Eemeren 2010) and in the Argomentum Model of Topics, and the Latin equivalent locus, used by 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958-1969)  
3  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/  
4  See Walton (2008, p. 230) for a terminological clarification about the term ‘enthymeme’, as 
normally intended in logic (an argument with an implicit premise or conclusion) and as, 
according to some scholars (for example Burnyeat 1994), originally intended by Aristotle. 




argumentation a premise used in support of a standpoint is related to that 
standpoint in order to bring about a transfer of acceptance from that premise 
to the standpoint (van Eemeren et al. 2014, p. 19).5 
Both topoi and schemes are theoretical accounts of what Wagemans 
calls the acceptability transfer principle (ATP) the inference whereby 
“accepting the argument renders the standpoint acceptable” (Wagemans 
2010, p. 1935).6 In very general terms, the relation between the ATP and the 




1.1’ ATP (1.11) (Wagemans 2010, p.1935) 
 
where, following the pragma-dialectical conventions, STP stands for 
standpoint (the defended proposition at the heart of a difference of opinion, or 
conclusion), ARG is the argument brought in support of said proposition, and 
ATP represents a correct way of transferring acceptability from the argument 
to the standpoint. 
Differences exist in how contemporary approaches to argumentation 
formulate schemes. Walton et al.’s compendium, for example, rests on the 
traditional denominations of major premise, minor premise, and conclusion, 
as shown below with regard to the argument from cause to effect: 
 
Major premise: generally, if A occurs, then B will (might) occur. 
Minor premise: In this case A occurs (might occur) 
Conclusion: Therefore, in this case, B will (might) occur (Walton et al. 2008, p. 
328). 
 
The pragma-dialectical approach formulates argumentative schemes resting 
on general relations (symptomatic, causal, of analogy – van Eemeren et al. 
2002) expressed in terms of conventions derived from logic, as exemplified 
below with specific reference to the causal scheme:  
 
 
5  In this respect the scheme performs the same function of classical topoi, according to the second 
meaning of the notion in Aristotle. 
6  Akin to the concept of ATP is the notion of ‘unexpressed premise’, or ‘warrant’ in Toulmin’s 
model, but also the pragma-dialectical ‘pragmatic optimum’ (see Garssen 2001; Toulmin 2003, 
ch. 3; van Eemeren, Grootendorst 1992, ch.6.). According to Wagemans (2010, p. 1939), though, 
his own ATP differs in that it is a “general expression of the speaker’s commitment with regard 
to the justificatory force of any explicit argument”.  
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Y is true of X [standpoint],  
because Z is true of X [supporting argument]  
and Z leads to Y [inference linking the supporting argument and the 
conclusion, or ATP].  
 
Differently from other approaches, where premises are represented before the 
conclusion, in the pragma-dialectical approach the standpoint is stated first, 
followed by the argument supporting it (introduced by ‘because’), while the 
inference backing its justificatory force is made explicit in the last line, 
introduced by ‘and’. 
Identifying the scheme used in real-life arguments allows for an 
assessment of argumentation. Depending on the type of relationship 
(symptomatic, causal or analogy), different sets of critical questions can be 
asked to test the validity of an argument. This is because the critical questions 
associated to a scheme “capture the specific pragmatic rationale for bringing 
about the transition of acceptance from the premise to the standpoint” (van 
Eemeren et al. 2014, p. 19). 
The pragma-dialectical argument schemes have the advantage of being 
general enough as to be applicable to virtually all cases of reasoning. Most 
argumentation schemes listed in other typologies correspond to a main type, 
variant or sub-type of an argumentation scheme recognized in the pragma-
dialectical typology (Garssen 1997, p. 246).7 Differently from longer 
classifications of topoi, the pragma-dialectical schemes are easily memorised, 
adding greatly to their appeal also beyond the circle of argumentation 
scholars. Furthermore, although the notion of topoi is not generally included 
in the pragma-dialectical representation of schemes, it is not incompatible 
with it. As Wagemans points out, schemes and topoi can be integrated as 
follows: 
 
1 Being an animal (P) is true of Socrates (R). 
1.1 Being a man (Q) is true of Socrates (R). 
1.1’ Accepting that Socrates is a man renders acceptable that Socrates is an 
animal (Q is true of RP is true of R). [ATP]  
1.1’.1 The topos “What belongs to a species, also belongs to the genus” 
applies. (Wagemans 2010, p.1938) 
 
In the Discourse Historical approach (Reisigl, Wodak 2001), the perspective 
is in a way reversed. Instead of looking for some unifying logical principles 
that underlie different realisations of a given argument, attention is paid to 
topoi used in discourse for their content and the attendant ideological 
 
7  Garssen made this claim based on a review of the following typologies: Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca ([1958] 1969), Hastings (1962), McBurney and Mills (1964), Schellens (1985), 
Kienpointner (1992) and Freeley (1993). 




implications. The topoi maintain their functional nature, as they serve as a 
rule that warrants a conclusion (Reisigl 2014, p. 84), but the conclusion rule 
is derived ad hoc rather than having regard to formalised classifications of 
topoi. An example of a content-based topos identified from the Discourse-
Historical perspective is the “Topos of repaying the diligent and good 
workers/nationals”, whose conclusion rule is:  
 
If you vote for my party, or we get the power, then the diligent and good 
workers will be repaid. (Reisigl 2014, p. 79) 
 
A model that tries to accommodate both a formal concern and attention for 
the content is the Argomentum Model of Topics or AMT (Rigotti 2006, 
2009; Rigotti, Greco Morasso 2010). Conceived as a contribution to 
advancing the pragma-dialectical understanding of topoi, it places emphasis 
on the connection between the material (content-based) starting points and 
the procedural (formal, or logical) starting points. At the same time, it helps 
identify the inferential connection at play in a given argument, thus 
highlighting “the source of the force of the statement presented as an 
argument in relation to the statement presented as a standpoint” (Rigotti, 
Greco Morasso 2010, p. 500). In the y-shaped AMT representation of a topos, 
all the elements (be they explicitly mentioned in argumentation or implicitly 
recoverable) are charted along two diagonal lines intersecting at a given 




Figure 1  
AMT model, adapted from Rigotti (2010, p. 508). 
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The procedural line sets out the topos structure, drawing on existing 
typologies and using the language of logic. In so doing it provides a sort of 
‘roadmap’ for the reconstruction of a given example of argumentation as an 
instantiation of a specific topos. The material line feeds in the contents, 
drawing on the discourse at issue. Generally speaking, along the procedural 
line, the first element is the locus, for example, argument from analogy. 
Under the locus, one of the maxims deriving from it is indicated. For the sake 
of terminological clarity, the AMT maxim corresponds to Toulmin’s warrant, 
Kienpointner’s Schlussregel, and the pragma-dialectical notion of 
‘argumentative principle of support’ (Garrsen 2001; van Eemeren, 
Grotendorst 1992). Irrespectively of the name, the maxim is the inferential 
connection formulated following the if…then convention, therefore 
representing the core of the topos. The maxim functions as a major premise 
and is formulated in abstract terms, without any reference to the specific 
context in which the argument is used. Under the maxim comes the minor (or 
second) premise, which is the point in which the procedural and the material 
dimensions intersect. The procedural minor premise thus provides an 
anchorage to the specific content and contexts of the argument. Taken 
together, the maxim and the minor premise support the conclusion, and the 
reasoning is logically valid if all premises are true. The truth of the minor 
premise must be derived from the external reality, that is to say, from 
material starting points (Rigotti, Greco Morasso 2010, p. 500), hence the 
intersection of the two dimensions. Along the material starting points line, 
another set of premises is to be found: one premise is general, the endoxon, 
representing a general belief taken as common ground to the parties, and the 
other is specific and factual, corresponding to Toulmin’s datum. The 
conclusion deriving from this second set of premises along the line of the 
material starting points, called preliminary conclusion, forms that minor 
premise which along with the maxim, supports the final conclusion. As 
Rigotti and Greco Morasso (2010 pp. 501-502) put it,  
 
such a preliminary conclusion derives from the material starting point, but it is 
equally exploited by the procedural starting point being associated to the 
maxim as a second premise. 
 
Figure 2 below provides an example of a topos based on analogy according to 
the AMT model: 
 






Figure 2  
The AMT model (Rigotti, Greco Morasso 2010, p. 499). 
 
Here the arguer makes a forecast about the likelihood that there may be a 
traffic jam “tonight” (final conclusion) drawing on a previous experience of 
traffic jams on a similar occasion. The reasoning rests therefore on the locus 
from analogy, with the attendant maxim “If something was the case for 
something of the same functional genus as X, this may also be the case for 
x”. For the reasoning to be valid, two material conditions must be met: that 
there actually was a traffic jam on a previous situation (corresponding to the 
maxim’s “something was the case for something…”), and that the previous 
situation is comparable to the current one (corresponding to “…something of 
the same functional genus as X”). The preliminary conclusion affirms that 
both these conditions are true and serves at the same time as the maxim’s 
minor premise. Moving backward along the material line, the (material) 
minor premise and endoxon are meant to defend the preliminary conclusion. 
First, it is stated that there was a traffic jam on New Year’s Eve, which is 
taken as a factual datum acceptable as is by the other party without further 
need of defence; second, it is inferentially implied that the current national 
holiday and New Year’s Eve are comparable, on the ground of a shared 
understanding of big celebrations as a time when people are likely to take 
their cars and go for a trip (endoxon). At this point of the scheme, the arguer 
has demonstrated that something was the case for something of the same 
functional genus as X, thus meeting the condition expressed in the If- 
proposition of the maxim. What remains to be done is simply drawing the 
conclusion (corresponding to the then-proposition of the maxim), namely, 
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that there may be a traffic jam “tonight” as well (“this may be the case for 
x”). 
Adopting pragma-dialectical conventions, the same argumentation 





Argumentation structure according to pragma-dialectical conventions. 
 
As can be noticed, all the material starting points, whether explicit or 
implicit, find their way in this representation. 1.1. is equivalent to the material 
minor premise, while the unexpressed premises 1.1’ and 1.1.1’ account for 
the endoxon. The procedural starting points though, the locus and the maxim, 
are not represented, nor are they fully included in the attendant argument 
scheme: 
 
There might be traffic jam (Y) is true of tonight (X) 
Because there being traffic jam (Y) is true of New Year’s Eve (Z) 
And Tonight (X) and New Year’s Eve (Z) are analogous. 
 
The third line in the scheme above expresses the acceptability transfer 
principle (ATP) which is procedural and contains a reference to the type of 
scheme (in this case the scheme based on analogy), thus partly performing 
the function of the topos in the AMT model, but the maxim is unrepresented. 
As Rigotti and Greco Morasso put it,  
 
what we have called the second level or maxim in the AMT is not explicitly 
formulated in the general representation of the argument scheme in pragma-
dialectics”. (Rigotti, Greco Morasso 2010, p. 507)  
 
Some maxims, they continue, are taken into account in the “discursive 
description” of the different subtypes of argument schemes (Garssen 2009; 
van Eemeren et al. 2007, pp. 137). For example, a specific sub-type of 




argumentation from analogy based on the ‘‘principle of justice’’ (Garssen 
2001, p. 92) can be expressed as “people who are in similar situations should 
be treated similarly’’, which corresponds to the maxim in the AMT’s 
terminology. The reason why maxims can be identified only with regard to 
specific subtypes of argument schemes, according to Rigotti and Greco 
Morasso (2010), is that “maxims are specific argumentative principles at 
work in concrete applications of argument schemes”. That is to say that the 
three main pragma-dialectical schemes are pitched too abstractly to seize the 
‘warrant’ that backs the inference leading from the premises to the 
conclusion. By the same token, the endoxon is not represented in pragma-
dialectical schemes, because it is necessarily context-bound. 
In this paper, the AMT model will be used as an interface between 
formalised classifications of schemes (see the user’s compendium in Walton 
et al. 2008) and real-life arguments used in the Brexit debate, comparing its 
affordances with those of the pragma-dialectical scheme. 
 
 
3. Materials and Method  
 
The analysis looks at editorials about the Brexit referendum published in UK 
quality newspapers with different political orientations  The Times, The 
Telegraph and The Guardian  over a 6-month timespan, from April to 
September 2016, with the referendum held on June 23. The articles were 
retrieved through the Lexis-Nexis database, and their number varies 
considerably across newspapers, with 35 documents in the Times, 29 in the 
Telegraph and 81 in the Guardian, totalling about 156,000 words.  
The search parameters limited the scope to items containing both the 
word Brexit and populism, since the materials were originally collected as 
part of a project on contemporary forms of populism in Europe. The focus 
was on how intellectual discourse (represented by editorials) engaged with 
populism, and the debate over Brexit proved an ideal object of analysis. An 
extremely heated and divisive topic, the referendum was closely-knit with the 
theme of populism, with the Leave campaign taking definitely populist tones.  
In a previous stage of the study (Degano, Sicurella 2019), informal 
topoi were identified adopting a content-based approach, without any 
reference to existing classifications. When large quantities of text are 
considered for their discursive construction of a portion of reality, the focus is 
quite naturally on the content and its linguistic presentation, more than on 
formal patterns of reasoning. A thorough systematic reconstruction of 
schemes would not be viable in the early stage of the analysis but can only be 
attained through a sequence of steps. Initially, then, topoi were intuitively 
identified as commonplaces that cumulatively build up, resulting in a given 
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discursive construal of reality. This initial collection of topoi, unmediated by 
any formalised model, was meant to ward off the risk of a skewed 
representation of the discourse at stake, where only straightforwardly 
recognisable arguments would find pride of place. Matching real-life uses of 
argument with formalised schemes can be a daunting task for discourse 
analysts, whose methodological armamentarium does not generally include a 
thorough knowledge of topoi/argument schemes. And while inventories like 
Walton et al.’s (2008) compendium are of great help, it can be difficult to 
connect a real-life argument with its abstract formulation. The pragma-
dialectical classification of schemes is certainly more manageable in size, but 
sometimes no scheme seems to be a suitable formal match for the argument 
at issue. As a result, an analysis carried out adopting in the first place a 
formal approach to schemes may produce a distorted picture, centred only on 
those occurrences that most obviously fit within a scheme, irrespectively of 
whether they are actually representative of the patterns of reasoning recurring 
in the discourse at stake.  
A relatively large number of informal ‘topoi’ were identified through 
qualitative manual coding of the materials in Degano, Sicurella (2019). Each 
was assigned a code (T1 to T16) and attributed to either Remain or Leave 
positions, as shown in Table 1: 
 
Pro-Remain Pro-Leave 
T1 The perversion of democracy. 
People must be restrained 
T2 A given standpoint is wrong 
because those who upheld it in the past 
were from the wrong side (fascists…) 
T5 Populist/ fascist/ racist slippery 
slope 
T6 Anti-right forces are not 
minoritarian, they only need re-
engaging 
T10 Populism to be fought as not in 
line with reality   
T13 Leave campaigners are abusing the 
people 
T14 The EU as a safety net against 
economic disintegration and war of all 
against all 
 
T3 The masses are better than what the 
elite think 
T4 The elite are too snob towards 
people concerns  
T7 The EU is not about democracy but 
liberalism / the free market 
T9 Don’t call me racist if I raise 
legitimate concerns (e.g. strain placed 
on British public service by 
immigration) 
T11 Leave is hedging ahead in spite of 
Remain propaganda (right because 
people vote for it) 
T12 The EU is antidemocratic 
T15 Disagreeing with the EU is 
perfectly reasonable 
T16 The EU is perceived as being about 
free trade and liberalism, but in fact it is 




Editorials on Brexit and populism – Preliminary list of informal ‘topoi’. 
 




The commonplaces thus identified were then grouped into fewer reasoning 
patterns, worded following the Discourse-Historical approach conventions. 
For example, T5, T10 and T13 would go under the Topos of populism as 
manipulation, scapegoating, and fearmongering, which was formulated as: 
 
If populist rhetoric relies on unfair practices of consensus construction (such 
as manipulation, scapegoating, and fearmongering), then sensible people must 
reject it. 
 
Some realizations of this are shown below, with italics added to highlight the 
most salient parts: 
 
(1) By polling day what else will we be left with at home? … having to cope with 
the swelling of a sour, xenophobic English nationalism masquerading as the 
liberation of the nation's mojo (to use Michael Gove's language). (The 
Guardian, June 8, 2016) 
 
(2) The Brexit campaign channelled this anger and focused it on a bunch of non 
sequiturs. Its leaders misled millions, as populists always do, by claiming that 
destroying international collaboration, stopping immigration and reasserting 
indigenous culture would somehow deepen democracy and make people better 
off. (The Guardian, August 1, 2016) 
 
(3) How is it possible that a billionaire bigot can present himself as the voice of 
the people, a brave truth teller speaking up for the little guy? How have we 
allowed xenophobes and racists to posture as advocates for democracy? (The 
Guardian, June 29, 2016) 
 
Threads T3 (The masses are better than what the elite think), T4 (The elite 
are too snob towards people concerns), and T9 (Don’t call me racist if I raise 
legitimate concerns such as the strain placed on British public service by 
immigration) have been grouped under the Topos of people legitimately 
turning to populist parties, whose rule reads  
 
If mainstream politics lets people down, then people turn to populist parties. 
 
Through this topos, mainstream politics is explicitly or implicitly urged to 
acknowledge the problems on which populism thrives, instead of ignoring or 
dismissing them as the result of manipulation. Examples are given below: 
 
(4)  […] We should not give an inch to the bigotry resurging in both Britain and 
the US, just as we shouldn’t give any ground to the anti-immigrant 
xenophobes in Australia. But to fight their hatred, we must – as a matter of 
urgency – articulate a progressive opposition to the conditions breeding such 
deep alienation. (The Guardian, June 20, 2016) 
 
(5) It’s a traditional argument of the right, an entirely conventional fear of the 
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ignorant masses and an entirely conventional plea for their stewardship by 
their betters. But over the last few days, it's been articulated again and again by 
liberals desperately floating ideas as to how a clearly expressed popular 
sentiment might be overturned. Nothing could be more disastrous. (The 
Guardian, June 26, 2016) 
 
(6) […] Roland Dacre Rudd [Remain] is a classic example of a privileged breed 
which is treating the views of ordinary, less fortunate Britons during this 
referendum with lofty disdain. His father was a stockbroker (of course), he 
went to public school (obviously) and Oxford where he was President of the 
Union (natch). The former European Commissioner Lord! (Peter) Mandelson 
is godfather to one of Rudd's children, who will never struggle to get into their 
first, second or third choice of secondary school due to uncontrolled EU 
migration (just a hunch). (The Telegraph, June 4, 2016) 
 
Drawing on the preliminary identification of informal topoi, this paper will 
try to find a formalised counterpart for them in Walton et al.’s compendium 
of schemes (2008). The schemes thus identified will be reconstructed using 
the AMT model, and, for the sake of comparison, one of them will be 
reconstructed also according to the pragma-dialectical approach, weighing 





The analysis will now proceed asking whether some of the topoi previously 
identified, as illustrated in the Material and Method Section, can be seen as 
context-specific realizations of any formalized scheme. 
 
4.1. Topos of populism as manipulation, scapegoating, and 
fearmongering 
 
A first correspondence is tentatively identified between the Topos of 
populism as manipulation, scapegoating, and fearmongering and topos 41 
‘ethotic argument’ (Walton et al. 2008, p. 336), which goes like this:  
 
Major premise: if x is a person of bad moral character, then what x says should 
be rejected as less plausible. 
Minor premise: x is a person of bad moral character 
Conclusion: Therefore, what x says should be rejected as less plausible 
 
This topos rests on a shared evaluation of a given characteristic of the other 
party, which is taken as symptomatic for their lack of reliability. Accusing the 
leaders of the Leave campaign of manipulation, fearmongering and 
scapegoating casts them as morally objectionable people, insofar as all such 
practices imply distorting facts with a deceitful intent. The ethos of the Leave 




leaders is thus brought to bear directly on the validity of their arguments; it is 
not their conduit in other fields of life that is taken as an indicator of their 
unreliability, as would be the case with ad-hominem topoi, but their lack of 
sincerity with regard to the merits of the discussion.  
Following the AMT model conventions, the argument can be 
reconstructed as follows: 
 
 
Figure 4  
Ethotic argument. 
 
In the maxim deriving from the ethotic argument used here, a pivotal role is 
played by the negative judgement passed on a ‘person of bad moral character’ 
– in the specific case, rather a group of people, namely the populist leaders of 
the Leave side. Those who use this argument must in the first place be 
confident that 1) the audience will be willing to accept this judgement, and 2) 
on these grounds, they will reject Leave’s position altogether. Seeing to it that 
this judgement is accepted is the ‘job’ of the material starting points, and the 
daily allegations of manipulation levelled against Leave arguments by 
Remain leaders and political commentators from the beginning of the 
campaign may have bestowed factuality on this point. The proposition that 
Leave leaders rest on manipulation, fearmongering and scapegoating is then 
used as a material minor premise, which together with the hardly 
challengeable endoxon that these are despicable practices in a democracy, 
leads to the preliminary conclusion that Leave populist leaders are of bad 
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moral character. The condition set by the maxim (if X is a person of bad 
moral character) is thus proved to be the case, and therefore it can be 
concluded that Leave positions should be rejected.  
From a discursive point of view, what is challenged here is the 
truthfulness of Leave leaders’ claims, and not the merits of their claims.  This 
topos, focusing attention on how despicable populists are, fails to 
acknowledge problems that populist sympathizers feel as real. Saying that 
populists are manipulative, for example, implies that problems are not real, 
but are conjured up by those who want to exploit them politically to get easy 
consensus. The minor premise that populist leaders campaigning for Leave 
are lying is likely to be accepted as an object of agreement only by those who 
already subscribe to an anti-populist, pro-Remain position. Even if evidence 
of manipulation was brought forth (which was the case) and managed, at best, 
to tarnish the reputation of the Leave campaign leaders, this did not affect the 
issues that their voters perceive as problematic. A leader with a tarnished 
reputation claiming to want to solve a problem may still come through as 
more appealing than a leader who denies that the problem exists altogether. If 
the point of argumentation is solving a difference of opinion, and to do so it is 
necessary to rest on some common starting points, failing to agree on the 
existence of the problem in the first place preempts any possibility of a 
dialectical exchange. It sounds more like an attempt not to engage in 
argumentation on its merits (Mohammed 2017) for lack of good arguments.8   
Considering also the ‘depreciation’ of truth within the populist camp in 
the so-called ‘post-truth era’, where it is assumed that data are continuously 
manipulated by the elite, argumentation based on the first topos is unlikely to 
appeal to populist voters. It seems rather to serve an epideictic function 
(Degano 2020), aiming to strengthen bonds and beliefs within the community 
of convinced Remainers, as opposed to winning consensus from outside.  
 
4.2. Topos of people legitimately turning to populism  
 
Another connection can be made between the Topos of people legitimately 
turning to populism (If mainstream politics lets people down, then people 
turn to populist parties) and topos 34. Pragmatic argument from alternatives 
(Walton et al. 2008, p. 318), which reads as:  
 
Premise I: Either you (the respondent) must bring about A, or B will occur 
Premise II: B is bad or undesirable, from your point of view 
 
8  This goes in a similar direction as that held by Mohammed (2017) in her analysis of accusations of 
inconsistency addressed by prime ministers to their adversaries in PM question time. As she points 
out, it is not reasonable enough to dismiss an issue by arguing that the issue should not become an 
object of debate, without taking position towards it (Mohammed 2017, p. 131). 




Conclusion: Therefore, you should (ought to, practically speaking) bring about 
A 
 
Having recourse to the AMT representation conventions, the topic can be 




Pragmatic argument from alternatives. 
 
Considering the roles envisaged by the maxims, ‘you’ refers to mainstream 
parties, especially the Labour Party who traditionally used to defend the 
interests of the lower classes; A stands for ‘defending the interests of 
traditional Labour voters’, and B is equivalent to ‘the shift of votes from 
Labour to populist positions’. What the maxim topicalises is failure: it is 
failure to accomplish a given action (A) which determines an alternative state 
of things (B). The material starting points are meant to demonstrate that the 
Labour Party has failed to defend the interests of its traditional voters, which 
in the Brexit discourse (and in populist discourse at large) is often done by 
representing national weaker groups as direct competitors of immigrants, and 
casting left-wing parties as the champions of immigrants’ rights to the 
detriment of national working classes, whom they supposedly represent. 
After all, immigration was one of the decisive topics of the campaign, with 
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the EU free circulation policy seen as the main obstacle to a proper control of 
UK borders. The endoxon, in this case, is potentially more controversial than 
the one discussed with regard to the ethotic argument. It establishes the 
principle that both immigration and EU circulation policies are antithetical to 
the interests of the lower classes, as it is in their communities that the impact 
of immigration is felt most. If one accepts that the Labour Party’s traditional 
pro-EU stance is particularly detrimental for its traditional voters, then the 
preliminary conclusion that Labour has failed to defend their main 
stakeholders’ interest can be taken as defended, and the reasoning can be 
concluded. To recap, following the syntax set out by the maxim, if 
mainstream parties, and the Labour party in particular, fail to defend the 
interests of traditional Labour voters, which is the case as shown by the 
party’s support for EU free circulation policy, then Labour voters may 
understandably turn to an alternative political force such as populism.  
This topos is used to explain voters’ preference for populist leaders as a 
plausible choice, as opposed to being an irrational despicable stance dictated 
by gut feelings. The other party in the discussion are those who, missing the 
point, blame the voters that have turned their back on the party they 
traditionally supported (namely the Labour Party) instead of the party that let 
them down. This topos differs substantially from the ethotic arguments 
discussed above, as it acknowledges the concerns of the voters. Such 
concerns are cast as a reasonable starting point, even though this does not 
necessarily entail an endorsement of populist leaders. Such an 
acknowledgement makes it possible for the editorialist to engage readers who 
may hold a grudge against Europe, while possibly marking their distance 





From a methodological point of view, a comparison of the AMT and the 
pragma-dialectical approach is in order to highlight the respective pros and 
cons. Taking just one of the topoi considered so far as an example, namely 
the Topos of people legitimately turning to populism (If mainstream politics 
lets people down, then people turn to populist parties), the pragma-dialectical 
reconstruction is as follows: 
 
1. Voters’ behaviour (turning to populist parties) is a natural consequence of 
mainstream parties’ behavior 
1.1 mainstream parties have let people down 
(1.1’) if mainstream parties let people down, people will turn to other forms of 
politics promising to defend their interests 
1.1.1 mainstream parties support for EU policies has favoured illegal 
immigration 




(1.1.1’ illegal immigration is especially threatening for the working class)  
 
The underlying scheme justifying the transition from the premise (1.1) to the 
conclusion is causal, and can be represented as: 
 
(Y) turning to populism is true of (X) former voters of mainstream politics  
Because (Z) being let down by mainstream politics is true of (X) former voters 
of mainstream parties 
And (Z) being let down by mainstream politics leads to (Y) turning to 
populism 
 
As the pragma-dialectical reconstruction shows, the result is not substantially 
different from the one achieved through the AMT model, insofar as both 
permit to identify the inference warranting the transition from the argument 
to the standpoint. In the AMT model the inference is made explicit by the 
maxim, while according to the pragma-dialectical scheme the inference is 
expressed in the third line of the scheme (‘and being let down by…’). The 
same inference can be represented also in the reconstruction of argumentation 
as an implicit premise (see 1.1’ above). However, the AMT model requires 
greater explicitation, due to its distinction between procedural and material 
starting points. The identification of the locus and the maxim deriving from 
it, in particular, can guide the analyst in the reconstruction of the argument, as 
the procedural dimension provides a more solid scaffolding for the 
reconstruction of the argument. Furthermore, the simple fact of deriving the 
maxim from a locus makes it possible to match real-life arguments with 
existing classifications of topoi, which can be useful when it comes to 
identifying the subtypes of the three main pragma-dialectical schemes. 
Finally, the AMT model embraces at once the argumentation structure 
(identifying conclusion and premises) and the kind of relation that justifies 
the transition from the premises to the conclusion. The pragma-dialectical 
reconstruction, instead, tackles the two aspects separately, as shown above, 
with the argument scheme reconstructed apart. 
On the other hand, the pragma-dialectical scheme makes it easier to 
verify the correctness of one’s reconstruction hypothesis; if the referents of 
Y, X, and Z are identified and formulated correctly, the rigidity of the scheme 
helps confirm the appropriateness of the reconstruction. If all the elements of 
the real-life argument fit in the scheme, this is a strong indicator that the 
argument (in both its explicit and implicit components) was properly 
reconstructed. Secondly, the pragma-dialectical conventions (see Fig. 3) 
allow for a more synthetic and comprehensive reconstruction of complex 
argumentation. The same would not be feasible with the AMT model, which 
focuses on one topos at a time, just like pragma-dialectical schemes. Finally, 
the three main pragma-dialectical schemes allow for a coarse-grained initial 
categorisation, which can then be refined looking for schemes that are 
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subtypes of that category. With regard to the argument above, one could say 
that the argument from alternatives is a subtype of causal reasoning typical of 
political discourse, insofar as it defends the view that if one party fails to 
accomplish what voters need, people will (or should) turn to other parties. 
The identification of such subtypes can result from the analysis of 
prototypical argumentative patterns, that is to say patterns that recur and are 
representative of a given domain or genre (van Eemeren 2017). As lists of 
prototypical patterns are produced with regard to specific genres, they would 
provide discourse analysts with an interface between longer lists of schemes 
and the actual examples they have intuitively identified in their texts. 
An important aspect from a discursive viewpoint is evaluation; for 
example, the topos of people legitimately turning to populist parties implies a 
disapproving attitude towards mainstream politics, and the Labour Party in 
particular, for failing in their mission. Neither the AMT model nor the 
pragma-dialectical scheme fully capture this evaluative aspect: both the 
argument from alternatives and the causal scheme point out a relation 
between a cause and an effect, therefore falling in the category of epistemic 
standpoints. The AMT model representation, however, seems to cater better 
for this specific interest of discourse analysis, showing that there is a 
mismatch between an expected behaviour (expressed in the endoxon slot) and 
an observed behaviour (conveyed by the material second premise), which 
paves the way for a negative evaluation.  
Furthermore, the AMT model might contribute to the discourse 
analyst’s agenda in another important way, which is not dealt with in this 
paper, but is worth mentioning. If argumentation is seen from the discursive 
perspective, it would be desirable to go beyond single texts and analyse entire 
corpora representative of a given strand of discourse. One hindrance in this 
respect has been the scarcity of research on linguistic indicators, words that 
might help retrieve a given discursive, or argumentative, aspect through 
corpus interrogation softwares. Existing studies have focused on words 
related to the procedural aspects of reasoning. For example, words like 
‘compare/compared’, ‘similar’, ‘equivalent’, ‘parallels’, ‘remind(s)’ can be 
indicators of argumentation based on analogy (van Eemeren et al. 2007, p. 
141). However, the procedural aspects of reasoning are often implicit, and 
people may be using an argument without linguistically codifying the relation 
on which it rests (Degano 2016). Sometimes, though, the problem is simply 
that the indicators cited in the literature are too general, while field-specific 
indicators, which might be more reliable, are not available in ready-made 
classifications. Starting from existing classifications of schemes or topics, 
and applying them to specific fields of discourse, one might find several 
potential indicators not only of a procedural, but also of a material nature. 
This is in line with Bigi and Greco Morasso’s view (2012) that some 




linguistic units, which following in Firth’s tradition (1957) they call 
‘keywords’, provide a link to context-specific shared premises in 
argumentation, functioning as the endoxon for a given argument scheme. 
With regard to the topoi discussed above, one might hypothesise that words 
like ‘manipulation’, ‘fear’, and ‘xenophobia’ could be indicators of the 
ethotic topos of populism as manipulation, scapegoating, and fearmongering, 
while words like ‘immigrants/immigration’, ‘working-class’ might point to 
uses of the pragmatic argument from alternatives instantiated in the topos of 





The analysis has made it possible to match some of the informal topoi used in 
the debate over Brexit and populism with more formalised topoi attested in 
the literature, and at the same time to compare the pragma-dialectical notion 
of schemes and the AMT model, discussing what benefits each could offer to 
discourse analysts. On the one hand, the pragma-dialectical threefold 
classification of schemes (symptomatic, causal, and based on analogy) is both 
comprehensive and manageable, and can have an initial orientating function 
for a scholar struggling to match real-life arguments with the rigour of 
theoretical accounts of arguments. However, such a classification is 
necessarily coarse-grained, and for a more fine-tuned analytic tool one should 
have recourse to the sub-types of reasoning for each main category. Further 
research in this direction is needed, as made clear by Walton and Macagno 
when saying that “the literature on classification of argumentation schemes is 
still very new, and so it seems hard to know the best way to proceed”. 
(Walton, Macagno 2016, p. 9). Resting on existing classifications of 
topoi/schemes, and setting them in relation with given genres, in line with the 
pragma-dialectical agenda of identifying prototypical argumentative patterns, 
could be a promising approach. On the other hand, forcing real-life 
arguments into the pragma-dialectical schemes can prove difficult, as it 
requires a substantial rewording that is not necessarily intuitive, and can 
prove frustrating for outsiders to argumentation. Discourse analysts may find 
it easier to rely on repertoires collecting several fine-grained schemes, whose 
variety increases the chances of finding a suitable match for a topos used in 
real-life discourse.  
As for the AMT model, at first sight it can appear even less user-
friendly than the pragma-dialectical schemes, but it has the advantage of 
providing slots where the premises of the traditional representation of 
schemes can be filled in, allowing a greater interaction between traditional 
typologies of topoi and contemporary approaches to them. The one-line space 
devoted to the principle of support (or acceptability transfer principle) in the 
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pragma-dialectical formulation of schemes is here unpacked into a topic and 
a maxim. The level of the maxim seems to provide a good balance between 
the abstract level of the locus (or the even more abstract level of the pragma-
dialectical main type of reasoning) and the context-specific usage of a given 
topos, which is crucial for discourse analysts. As Wagemans and Hitchcock 
(2011) point out, focusing on the maxim would facilitate the formulation of 
the unexpressed premise in argument schemes, which in turn would expand 
our understanding of sub-types of schemes. At the same time, resting on the 
AMT would allow a more systematic categorization of schemes used in given 
fields of discourse, obviating the sprawling proliferation of topoi that would 
derive from the purely content-based approach adopted by discourse studies. 
The results of studies on argumentative topoi from different disciplinary 
perspectives may thus become more readily comparable, enabling researchers 
to leverage on each other’s insights. With regard to the data presented here, 
adopting a more formalised approach has made it possible to identify two 
recurrent topoi of the discourse about Brexit and populism. One is based on 
the ethotic argument (a subtype of the symptomatic scheme), while the other 
rests on the locus from alternatives (a subtype of the causal scheme). Ethotic 
arguments invite people to reject a conclusion on the ground that those who 
support it are not worth trusting. In the Brexit debate this amounted to 
claiming that Leave was not an option because those who campaigned for it 
were populist, and as such, manipulative. In this way, undecided voters with a 
mild Leave inclination, were not engaged at all. Their concerns were cast as 
the fruit of manipulation, and hence negated, thus ruling out the possibility of 
a preliminary agreement on the premises (for example that those voters’ 
concerns were legitimate to an extent) which is crucial to profitably engage in 
argumentation. The function of this argument, then, appeared mostly to 
reinforce the conviction and the sense of belonging of those who already had 
a pro-European stance. The locus from alternatives, on the other hand, 
presents a given course of action as a logical consequence of someone else’s 
failure to act. In this way, the growing consensus for Leave and populism is 
seen as a consequence of mainstream parties (and particularly the Labour 
Party) to defend the working class in the face of external threats. Such a 
framing made it possible to acknowledge the concerns of those who blamed 
their insecurity on the European Union, and therefore saw Leave as a solution 
to their problem. This argument was used not to support Leave, but to 
criticize the stigmatization of Leave, and hence of their voters, on the part of 
pro-Remain commentators. It was mostly relied on by progressive and pro-
Remain editorialists warning their fellow Remainers of the risk that their 
entrenchment behind an outright condemnation of populism/Leave would 
preempt any possibility of dialogue with those who were to be won back to 
the pro-Remain camp. 




Further research may confirm whether the patterns identified here can be 
considered prototypical of the public debate in Europe about populism, 
sovereignism and Europeanism. Another possible development would be the 
identification of linguistic indicators of argumentation related to field-specific 
topoi, which in turn might facilitate the application of corpus linguistics to 
the analysis of argumentation. The AMT model, with its explicitation of 
premises, might help to highlight lexical indicators associated with material 
premises recurrently used in a given field. 
To conclude, the AMT model’s emphasis on the explicitation of 
implicit contents and inferences helps to assess the quality and the 
effectiveness of argumentation, which after all should be the point of all the 
reconstruction efforts. The reconstruction of the loci, maxims and material 
starting points for the two formalised topoi above adds clarity to the analysis 
and highlights their weaknesses or strengths, in terms of potentially engaging 
an audience who starts from different positions. Implicit values and beliefs 
constitute the objects of agreement for argumentation, and may thus account 
for the effectiveness of strategic maneouvering on a par with, and possibly 
even more than, procedural soundness. As such, they are per se worthy of 
attention and are potentially more important to discourse analysts than the 
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